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INTRODUCTION
National economic policies directed at stemming infla­
tion drove interest rates to record levels in 1980 and
1981. The high interest rates not only affected consumers 
but also state and local governments. State and local
governments were forced to drop plans for capital improve­
ments or to assume long term debt at interest rates more 
than double the rates paid a few years earlier. The higher 
costs of public debt arrived just as the pressures for
capital expenditures were increasing. Federal deadlines for 
improved water quality drew nearer, requiring upgraded water 
treatment and sewage facilities. Federal revenues that have 
in the past funded local public works were slated for reduc­
tions under the Reagan administration budget. Reductions in 
federal funding and a lack of any significant sharing of
state revenues made the assumption of increased debt pay­
ments increasingly difficult for local governments in Mon­
tana.
1
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State and local governments have traditionally fi­
nanced major capital improvements by issuing tax exempt 
bonds. The interest rates paid by local governments to bond 
holders have skyrocketed in the last five years from around 
four percent to current rates of nearly ten percent.
The Forty-Seventh Legislature, meeting in 1981, con­
sidered three pieces of legislation that were aimed at 
easing local government credit problems. The legislature 
quickly approved a bill removing the interest limits on 
bonds issued by units of local government. The statutory 
limits had effectively brought the issuing of bonds to a 
halt in the year prior to the legislature as bond interest 
rates soared beyond the maximum interest rates envisioned by 
prior legislative sessions.
Legislative consideration of the other two measures 
dealing with municipal bonds was not as favorable as elim­
ination of the interest ceilings. Both of the other bills 
would have established state operated programs to con­
solidate the marketing of municipal bonds, or as these 
programs are termed a state bond bank. Both pieces of bond 
bank legislation met an early demise in the Senate where 
they were introduced. The fate of the bond bank proposals 
provides a blasis for this paper. The brief testimony offered 
at the Taxation Committee hearing on the bond bank proposals 
provided a direct conflict between the claims of the spon­
sors that a bond bank would save local governments money,
and the opponents' testimony that a bond bank would increase 
the costs of issuing municipal bonds.
In an effort to determine if a bond bank would poten­
tially aid local governments, this paper will examine the 
case of a single county faced with a need for several bond 
issues. The purpose of this case study is to project the 
impact a bond bank might have in a local jurisdiction. The 
case study provides some conclusions as to the significance 
of local government savings to be realized from a state 
operated bond bank.
CHAPTER I
THE BOND BANK CONCEPT
State Credit Assistance Programs
The concept of state assistance to local governments 
in need of credit is not new. Canadian provinces developed 
general purpose bond banks as early as 1956 and Virginia 
developed the Virginia Public School Authority in the 
1960s.1 Bond banks are by no means the only types of state 
aid to improve local government credit. A report from the 
First Boston Corporation reviews the types of programs to 
promote and expedite financing of local capital projects and 
to lower the effective costs of borrowing. The report notes 
the three general types of credit assistance used by states:
1. State Guarantees— States assume a contingent 
liability for local debt obligations by promising 
to supplement or replace local resources as may be 
required to meet debt service payments.
2. State Financial Intermediation— States act as 
financial intermediaries in that debt is issued by
j f
1Ronald W. Forbes and Edward F. Renshaw, "State Bond Banks", 
Municipal Finance Officers Association Special Bulletin 
(September, 1972):1.
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the state, a state agency, or state authority and 
the proceeds are loaned to municipalities. Local 
resources alone provide for final debt repayment. 
Although guarantee and intermediary programs can 
exist separately, there are numerous examples 
where state financial intermediation is accom­
panied by state guarantees or other forms of 
assistance.
3. Debt Subsidy Grants— States may also bolster local 
resources by earmarking annual state aid payments 
or grants to localities for all or part of local 
debt service requirements.1
Under a state guarantee program, the state acts much 
like a cosigner on a commercial loan. The state promises 
that, if for some reason the local government unit cannot 
meet its obligations to the bond holder, the state will make 
the payment. The strength of the state's commitment varies 
from a pledge of full faith and credit for Some programs to 
pledges to only make up a portion of any local shortfall. 
State guarantee programs tend to be directed at specific 
types of local government projects such as school or sewage 
plants. The state does not get involved in the marketing of 
local bonds ifnder guarantee programs.
1Ronald W. Forbes and John E. Peterson, State Credit Assis­
tance to Local Government (New York: First Boston Corpo-
ration, 1978) p.3.
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The bond bank proposals fall under the general type of 
assistance termed state financial intermediation. Bond 
banks in some form exist in the following states: Maine,
Vermont, Virginia, Alaska, North Dakota and Puerto Rico. 
All of these programs share a general concept of a state 
agency selling bonds and lending the proceeds of the bond 
sale to local governments. Local governments in turn use 
the loan to make the capital improvements and their payments 
on the loan are used by the state to pay the bondholders.
The procedures for passing the state aid to local 
agencies and the types of local agencies that can receive 
aid vary a great deal. The most important variation in bond 
banks is the amount of state credit offered, or level of 
commitment, that is made in the process. If the state 
promises to pay the bondholders unconditionally in the event 
of a local default, the rating of the bonds go up and local 
government costs go down. If the state makes very little 
commitment to pay in the case of a local default, the sa 
vings to local governments are reduced.
Most debt subsidy programs have been directed at 
school construction. The New Jersey Qualified Bond Program 
provides for units of local government as well as schools.
Debt subsidy programs are possible in states that have 
programs to provide direct financial aid to local govern­
ments such as state revenue sharing programs. Under debt
7
subsidy programs, the local agency sells bonds and pledges a 
portion of the financial aid that would normally be forth­
coming from the state to cover annual payments of principal 
and interest. Through subsidy programs, the debt may become 
an obligation of the state, thus lowering interest rates 
because of the state’s superior credit rating. In other 
local subsidy programs, the state aid pledge serves as a 
backup to the local pledge, thus improving the bondholders 
security and the local agency’s credit rating. Debt subsidy 
programs do not attempt to aid the local governments in 
marketing bonds beyond providing technical assistance direc­
ted at improving credit ratings.
How The Bond Bank Works
The bond bank concept seeks to lower local government 
credit costs in three ways: 1) marketing costs are reduced
by selling several small bond issues together as one large 
issue, 2) risks of bond holders are spread among several 
units of local governments and, 3) the state's superior 
credit rating is substituted for local ratings.
The greatest variation among general-purpose state 
bond banks is the strength of the state commitment to pay in 
case of a local government defaulting. The spectrum of 
state commitments range from some states where the bond bank 
serves mainly as a clearinghouse to package many small bond 
issues into a large issue —  to states that back the bonds 
with the full faith and credit of the state in the event of
8
a default.
Much has been written about the Maine Bond Bank; and, 
for purposes of describing how a bond bank operates, the 
process used in Maine will be described. The Maine Bond 
Bank is typical of state bond banks and similar in structure 
to the proposals made to the 1981 Legislature.
The bond bank is an autonomous instrumentality of the 
State of Maine and does not receive a state appropriation. 
The bond bank is governed by a five member board of direc­
tors that function much as the directors of a commercial 
bank.
The bank was begun with a small loan from the general 
fund and now operates from the interest earnings of its 
reserve account. The reserve account is generally estab­
lished by selling additional bonds and placing the proceeds 
in a reserve account that provides the initial security 
against a default. Reserve accounts are generally required 
for all bond issues. The minimum balance of the reserve 
account is generally equal to the highest annual payment of 
principal and interest. If the bonds were issued by local 
governments, the local governments would be required to 
maintain reserve accounts. The bond bank, however, main­
tains the reserve account for all its municipal borrowers.
The first step in the process of acquiring capital for 
local governments is for the bond bank staff to assist units 
of local government in developing the local bond issue. The
9
bond bank does not relieve local governments of any statu­
tory prerequisites for selling bonds. Local units of go­
vernment must still have a local referendum approved and 
obtain an opinion from a qualified bond counsel. After the 
local government has properly packaged its bond issue and 
received voter approval, an application can be made to the 
state bond bank. If the bond bank directors approve the 
local application, an agreement is drawn up between the 
local government and the bond bank specifying the maximum 
rate of interest that the municipality will pay. If the 
local government needs to proceed immediately with construc­
tion, the local unit may sell bond anticipation notes to the 
state bond bank.
The Maine Bond Bank makes no attempt to market its 
securities until at least $6 million in local bond applica­
tions have been approved. When the bank has gathered $6 
million (and preferably $10 million) in local bond requests, 
it will issue state bonds. The bond bank will sell state 
bonds in an amount to cover the total of local bond issues 
plus extra bonds to provide a reserve fund for the bond 
issue. The state bonds can then be rated and sold either 
through negotiations with underwriters or through a bid 
process. On'4 the same day that the bond bank receives a 
check for its bond issue from private investors, it issues 
checks to units of local government honoring their loan 
requests and the final interest rate is entered in the
10
agreement between the bank and the local government.1
After the locality has received its funds from the 
bond bank, the locality is responsible for meeting its 
semiannual principal and interest payments. The principal 
and interest payments are made to the state bond bank in 
accordance with the loan agreement. The bond bank, in turn, 
consolidates all of the local governments payments into a 
single annual payment to the investors who have purchased 
the bond bank’s bonds.
In the event of a default by a local government, the 
state bond bank would first fall back on a contingency fund 
generated from interest earnings on the reserve account. 
The contingency fund is only designed for temporary replace­
ment of local payments. A longer term or permanent default 
would then fall upon the reserve fund.
If defaults were to threaten the requirements of the 
reserve fund, the bond bank could ask the governor for an 
emergency appropriation of state funds to replenish the 
reserve account, or the bond bank could begin a legal action 
to collect the payments from the delinquent locality.
1 Jimmy E. Hicks and James E. Garrett, The Bond Bank Inno­
vation : Maine1s Experience, (Lexington, Kentucky:
Council of State Governments [1977[), p.9-11.
CHAPTER II
MONTANA’S BOND BANK PROPOSALS
The Forty-Seventh Legislature 
Bond bank bills introduced in the Forty-Seventh Legis­
lature would have created bond banks similar to the bond 
bank described in the previous chapter. As in the case of 
Maine, neither of the two bills would have pledged Montana's 
full faith and credit to the obligations of the municipal 
bond bank. As with the Maine example, the legislature would 
only pledge a "moral obligation" to repay the debt from the 
bonds. A pledge of full faith and credit would have re­
quired a vote of two-thirds of the legislature in order to 
comply with the debt provisions of Montana's constitution. 
A separate authority was not proposed by either piece of 
legislation, which, if enacted, would have been administered 
by existing state agencies.
Senator Tom Towe was the prime sponsor of Senate Bill 
476, which would have authorized a Montana Municipal Bond 
Bank to purchase bonds from all political subdivisions of 
the state. The bond bank was to be empowered to issue bonds 
and notes payable from the funds received from loans to 
local government units and interest earnings on the reserve
11
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account. Senate Bill 476 had a unique additional feature
that would have allowed the state Board of Investments to 
purchase the bonds of the bond bank. This feature would
appear to not provide any advantage to the Board of Invest­
ments in that the bond bank bonds would have been tax exempt 
and yield much lower earnings than the commercial securities 
in which the board currently invests. Senate Bill 476 was 
eventually approved by the Senate Taxation Committee after 
amendments removed all political subdivisions except munici­
palities from the bill. The amendments, however, provided 
only a short reprieve before the bill was indefinitely 
postponed for further consideration on the Senate floor.
Senate Bill 423, introduced by Senator Harold Dover, 
provided for a bond bank to be administered by the State 
Board of Investments. Senate Bill 423 was tabled by the
Senate Taxation Committee and received no further considera­
tion in the 1981 legislature.
Senator Dover's bill had three features that made the
bill different from the traditional bond bank approach
followed by Senator Towe. The most significant difference 
was that Dover's bill would have limited assistance to bond 
issues under $100,000. The limit of $100,000 would have 
nearly eliminated any chance of the bond bank reducing local 
government bond marketing costs. The issues of the state
bond bank would have been so small with the $100,000 limit
that the state could not have marketed the bonds at a
13
significantly lower cost than the local government could 
have marketed their own bonds. The bond bank would have to 
collect over sixty local issues in order to approach the $6 
million minimum bond issue described for the Maine Bond 
Bank.
In opposing the bond bank legislation, Bruce Mackenzie 
of D. A. Davidson and Company presented a list of small 
Montana issues underwritten by his firm in recent years. 
This list is attached as Appendix A. A review of the D. A. 
Davidson list of recent issues indicates that only ten of 
seventy-three issues were in amounts under $100,000.
A second feature of the Dover bill would have allowed 
the state to pledge future state aid to the municipality as 
security for the bond. Under this provision, if a munici­
pality did not meet its bond payment, the state could make 
the bond payment by deducting the amount needed from some 
unspecified state aid payment to the municipality. This 
feature of the bill would have worked much the same way as 
debt susbidy programs described earlier in this paper.
A final feature of the Dover bill was that only munic­
ipalities would be allowed to use the bond bank. This 
feature, coupled with the $100,000 limit, would have left 
the bond bank with a very small market. Of the recent 
seventy-three issues underwritten by D. A. Davidson and 
Company, only three were municipal issues of less than 
$100,000.
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Opponent and Proponent Arguments 
Proponents of Senator Towe's Senate Bill 476 generally 
cited the success of other states and, in particular, the
State of Maine in reducing the costs of local bond issues.
Senator Dover, in proposing Senate Bill 423, was much more 
guarded in explaining a bond bank's potential benefits. The 
minutes of the Senate Taxation Committee summarize Dover's 
testimony as follows: "The purpose is to save paperwork and
possibly interest payments to small entities for small 
amounts."1
The only opponent to the bond bank proposals was Bruce 
Mackenzie of D. A. Davidson and Company, an investment firm
that provides underwriting for a substantial share of the
municipal bonds issued in Montana. In representing D. A. 
Davidson and Company, Mackenzie offered the following argu­
ments against the bond bank:
1. At the present time, issuing entities within 
Montana are being provided low interest rate money 
by various bond dealers. Montana had the third 
lowest average net interest cost of all fifty 
states and was well below the five states with 
bond banks. D. A. Davidson rates are in many
1Hearings before the Senate Committee on Taxation on Senate 
Bill 423, Forty-Seventh Montana Legislature, February 20, 
1981.
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cases, equal to and often below what A-rated bonds 
sell for on the national market, even though many 
of these issues would not be A-rated.
2. Operating expenses of the bank must be passed on 
to the local communities.
3. Because of the low number of small projects issued 
in the state, it could take a substantial amount 
of time to collect sufficient issues before the 
bank could issue the bonds.
4. Since the bank would, in effect, be packaging all 
Montana's small issues into one large issue, the 
bank would favor the larger eastern bond firms and 
not regional firms that have serviced the area for 
a number of years.1
The arguments for and against a state bond bank may be 
classified under four issues for purposes of discussion. 
The four issues as laid out by the bond bank opponent are:
1. Will the bond bank save local governments any 
money?
2. Will the bond bank's operational costs be passed 
on to local governments?
3. Does Montana sell enough bonds to make a bond bank
«̂rfeasible?
1Ibid.
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4. By packaging bonds into bigger sales, would local 
investors be eliminated?
Local Government Savings
Proponents claiming the potential savings of bond 
banks often cite the experience of Maine as set out in a 
Council of State Governments Report. The report stated 
that, in its initial four issues, the bond bank is estimated 
to have saved municipalities over $1,400,000 in interest 
costs, or approximately 3.5 percent of the $41 million 
aggregate value of the four issues.1 Another report review­
ing the experience of Maine and Vermont concluded that 
savings as a percent of the issue size averaged 4.4 percent 
in Maine and 3.8 percent in Vermont.2
Is there a need for a bond bank if D. A. Davidson and 
Company can sell bonds below national rates? The testimoney 
presented by the underwriting firm (attached as Appendix A 
and Appendix B)3 indicates that, in all but ten of seventy- 
three issues underwritten since 1975, D. A. Davidson and
1Hicks and Jarrett, The Bond Bank Experience, 19.
2Martin T. Katzman, "Measuring the Benefits of Municipal 
Bond Banks", (paper, Harvard University, 1976) p.10.
3Senate Committee on Taxation, February 20, 1981.
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Company sold at interest rates below the Bond Buyer Index.1 
D. A. Davidson provided further testimony that Montana had 
the third lowest average net interest cost of all fifty 
states and was well below the five states with bond banks 
(Appendix B).2 The testimony of D. A. Davidson would seem 
to suggest that the investment firm is more interested in 
the costs to local government than in the investors who come 
to their firm to purchase tax exempt securities. Why would 
an investment firm sell its investors securities that yield 
less earnings than securities are yielding on a national 
average?
A further question might be: Why are D. A. Davidson 
and Company's investors willing to accept lower earnings 
from securities that involve greater investment risk? The 
majority of the issues underwritten by D. A. Davidson and 
Company are either unrated issues or from local government 
units that have not been rated. The Bond Buyer Index is 
made up of rated bonds that have received one of Moody's top 
four credit designations.
JThe Bond Buyer Twenty Bond Index (BBI) is the arithmetical 
average yield of twenty selected state and city bonds. 
Each bond is rated within Moody's top four credit ratings. 
The average rating for the Bond Buyer Twenty Bond Index 
falls midway between Moody's Aa and A rating classifica­
tions.
1Bruce A. Mackenzie, letter from D. A. Davidson and Company 
to Senate Taxation Committee, Helena, February 17, 1981.
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A likely explanation for the low interest rates for 
bond issues underwritten by D. A. Davidson and Company is 
the special tax treatment given to bond interest earnings of 
the State of Montana and its political subdivisions. Mon­
tana tax laws allow earnings from Montana tax exempt bonds 
to be deducted from the calculation of adjusted gross income 
for purposes of determination of individual income tax.1 
Earnings from local tax exempt bonds are also exempt from 
state taxes in twenty-six other states.2 The effect of this 
treatment of income from tax exempt bonds is to make the 
interest rates on bonds bought and sold in Montana not 
comparable with national indices of interest rates.
To illustrate why bond issues bought and sold in 
Montana cannot be compared with national interest rates, it 
is necessary to look beyond the coupon rate, or the interest 
rate stated on the bond, to the earnings of the bond when 
compared to a taxable security. For example, a person in 
the thirty percent tax bracket would receive the same after 
federal taxes earning on a taxable security paying ten 
percent that he would receive on a tax exempt security
1Montana Codes Annotated, Section 15-30-111(a).
2Commerce Clearinghouse, Inc., State Tax Guide, Chicago, 
1980.
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paying seven percent.1 If the person in the example paid 
taxes in Montana and the tax exempt security was issued in 
Montana, the earnings of the bond would also be exempt from 
state taxes. If the bond were then compared to a security 
taxed by both state and federal governments, the taxable 
security would have to pay ten and seven-tenths percent 
interest to yield the same after tax earnings as the tax 
exempt security.
States that grant tax exemption to the bonds of po­
litical subdivisions are already providing aid to local 
governments, to the extent that local bonds are marketed and 
held within the state. The revenue lost by the state gran­
ting tax exemption to local bonds is the local units' gain 
in terms of lower interest rates on their bonds that are 
locally marketed. To the extent that D. A. Davidson and 
Company can establish that they can underwrite bond issues 
with lower interest rates than national indices, it must be 
noted that the national indices may not be indicative of the 
interest rates that would be obtained by a bond bank.
The issue of in-state marketing being more economical 
than out-of-state marketing does raise a point that merits 
some discussion. An argument often made by bond bank pro­
ponents is that more favorable interest rates can be
3Peter N. Goldsmith, Investments for a Changing Economy, 
(New York: Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith,
Inc., August/September, 1980) p.15.
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obtained by marketing the bonds in larger issues, rather 
than in several small issues. If a bond bank were to gather 
several small, local issues into a large issue, it would 
probably reduce the potential for marketing the bonds in 
Montana because Montana lacks large financial and banking 
centers, and finding investors interested in large issues 
might be difficult. A bond bank would need to determine if 
it would be more economical to sell bonds through large 
issues to out-of-state investors, or through smaller sales 
to local investors who could take advantage of state tax 
breaks.
The rates presented by D. A. Davidson may have indi­
cated how well their firm compares to the rest of the nation 
in terms of municipal bonds, but does not indicate how their 
bonds would compare to bonds issued by the state of Montana. 
The interest rates indicated by the Bond Buyer Index include 
city as well as state bonds. The interest rates on state 
bonds are generally lower than the rates on local government 
bonds. . When compared to state bond yields —  as reflected 
by Moody's Index of ten year state bonds —  the D. A. David­
son rates are not as favorable. The comparison for the most 
recent three years indicates that, on an average, the 
Moody's average rate for state bonds rated Aa was .585
21
percent lower than the D. A. Davidson rates.1
Operational Costs
The second objection raised by bond bank opponents was 
that the costs of operating a bond bank would be passed on 
to local governments. D. A. Davidson and Company estimated 
that the bond bank would cost $154,693 each year to operate, 
and that these costs would be passed along to local govern­
ments who used the bond bank.2 The estimate of the bond 
bank’s operational cost came from the fiscal year 1978 costs 
for operating the Alaska Bond Bank.
The D. A. Davidson testimony asserted that the opera­
tional costs would be covered by a one percent interest 
surcharge on loans to local government. In other states, as 
well as with the State of Montana Housing Authority, the 
operational costs are paid from the interest earnings on the 
reserve fund.
Minimum requirements for the reserve account balance 
generally are equal to the maximum amount of principal and 
interest to come due in any future year of the bond issue. 
For example, if the bond bank were to market $10 million in 
bonds to be amortized in equal payments over twenty years at
1Moody’s Investor's Service. Moody’s Municipal and Govern­
ment Manual, (New York: Dun and Bradstreet Corporation,
1981) Vol. 2, p. al4.
2MacKenzie, letter from D. A. Davidson and Company.
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an interest rate of nine percent, the annual payment would 
be approximately $1,080,000. In this example, $1,080,000 
would also be the reserve requirement held by the bond bank 
and, invested at twelve percent, would yield $129,600. If 
additional issues were sold by the bank and the reserve 
requirements increased, the earnings of the reserve account 
would also increase. Both Senate Bill 423 and Senate Bill 
476 would have provided for the use of interest earnings on 
the reserve account to fund the operational costs of the 
bond bank. If it could be assumed that, in the absence of a 
state bond bank, the local government would be able to sell 
bonds and would have reserve requirements similar to the 
previous example, the interest earnings on the reserve 
account could constitute a potential source of revenue for 
the local government. It could be argued that, by allowing 
the state to hold the reserve requirement> there would be a 
loss of revenue to local governments. The operational costs 
of a state bond bank would not be a new cost to Montana 
taxpayers. The costs of marketing and servicing bonds are 
currently born by the municipalities. The creation of a 
bond bank would shift the incidence of these costs from 
local to state government. So while local governments would 
no longer collect revenues from investment of reserves, they 
would no longer be required to pay the costs of administer­
ing and marketing municipal bonds.
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D. A. Davidson argued that the costs of a bond bank 
would be passed to local government. On closer examination, 
it would appear to the contrary that local costs would be 
passed to the state. In passing their costs for adminis­
tering bonds to the state, local governments would also pass 
potential revenues associated with administering the bond 
reserves.
Number of Small Issues
D. A. Davidson, in opposing the bond bank, questioned 
whether there are enough small bond issues sold in Montana 
to make a bond bank feasible. D. A. Davidson's testimony 
was directed at both bills, though only Dover's bill re­
stricted the bond bank to small issues. This may reflect a 
feeling by the investment firm that the participants in any 
bond bank program would be primarily smaller units of go­
vernment .
Historic information on the number and size of bond 
issues is difficult to evaluate because statutory interest 
ceilings have almost eliminated the issuance of municipal 
bonds in recent years. In that local government partici­
pation in the bond bank would be voluntary, it would be 
difficult to predict how many local issues would be ini­
tially sold through the state program. The next two years 
should provide a good indication of the potential number of 
local bond issues, especially if there is some easing of the
24
record interest rates. If the capital improvements being 
planned for Lewis and Clark County are indicative of the 
rest of the state, Montana will see a brisk increase in 
borrowing by local governments.
Local Investment Firms
The final issue raised by opponents was that, by 
packaging bonds into larger issues, local investors would be 
eliminated from buying Montana bonds. Montana does not have 
the large financial market to purchase large lots of tax 
exempt bonds. By attempting to reduce local borrowing costs 
by preparing larger issues, the bond bank would no doubt be 
looking to national markets.
A bond bank would hurt Montana investors seeking a 
shelter from Montana income taxes by reducing the local 
supply of tax exempt bonds. This reduction in bond supply 
would in turn reduce the business of local investment firms. 
The state, on the other hand, would benefit from increased 
out-of-:state sales because less personal income would be 
sheltered and revenue from income taxes would increase. 
Local governments could also expect to benefit if, in mar­
keting the bonds, the bond bank determined that a large 
issue sold out-of-state was more economical than a small 
in-state issuance. The issue of loss of in-state investors 
would appear to be a question of balancing earnings of some 
investors and investment firms against potential cost savings
25
for local governments.
Preconditions for a Bond Bank
The study of bond banks by the Council of State Go­
vernments sets out some preconditions that might exist in a 
state in need of a bond bank.1 Those preconditions are as 
follows:
1. a sufficient number of small bond issues;
2. numerous, small, unrated local units of govern­
ment;
3. lack of demand by commercial banks for local 
government issues;
4. a market for tax exempt debt from governmental 
entities; and
5. the state should have a credit rating favorable 
enough to provide for a significant spread between 
state and local interest rates.
Montana has numerous local government units, most of 
which do not have credit ratings from credit rating ser­
vices. Montana has fifty-six counties of which twenty-eight 
have outstanding bonded indebtedness and only six counties 
are rated by Moody's. Montana has 125 cities and towns of 
which sixty-one have outstanding debts and nine are rated by 
Moody's. Of Montana's 471 school districts and 312 special
1Hicks and Jarrett, The Bond Bank Experience, 27.
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districts, only 22 have a rating from Moody's.1 The number 
of issues, as previously mentioned, is hard to evaluate due 
to the effects of the statutory interest ceilings. Appendix 
A would indicate that, in the period just prior to hitting 
the seven percent interest ceiling, D. A. Davidson was 
underwriting a good number of small issues. In 1977, D. A. 
Davidson underwrote twenty-five issues totalling $17,133,500 
of just general obligation bonds. Of all new issues under­
written by D. A. Davidson in 1977, twelve percent were 
general obligation bonds with the balance made up of twelve 
percent revenue bonds, thirty-five percent industrial reve­
nue bonds, and forty-one percent special improvement dis­
trict bonds.2
Another prerequisite for a bond bank is a lack of 
demand for bonds by commercial banks. In 1978, eighty-one 
percent of all general obligation bonds sold by D. A. D 
avidson were sold to banks. Legislation enacted in 1979 
removed the exemption for state tax from bonds owned by 
corporations. The change in legislation would not probably 
cause any great change in the ownership pattern of tax 
exempt bonds in that the federal tax exemption is the major
1Moody's Investors Service. Moody's Municipal and Govern­
ment Manual (New York: Dun and Bradstreet Corporation,
1981) Vol. 1, p. 2081-6.
^Eugene S. Hufford, letter from D. A. Davidson and Company 
to Montana Legislative Council, August 7, 1978.
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consideration in buying bonds.. Nationally commercial banks 
constitute a decreasing share of the market for municipal 
securities. In 1977, commercial banks constituted only 4.2 
percent of the net investment in municipal securities —  
down from 28.1 percent in 1974.*
The state should have a significantly better credit 
rating than local government if a bond bank is to be 
feasible. The state currently has a Moody's rating of Aa 
but is bordering on a Aaa rating. A 1979 report from the 
Continental Bank of Chicago states:
"Montana benefits from a relatively diverse and 
steady expanding economy. The greater national impor­
tance placed on domestic energy sources should enhance 
the state's economy and stimulate further economic 
growth. The income levels are below average, but 
improving. In recent years, the state's resource base 
has demonstrated good growth in both population and 
personal income. The debt load remains low and finan­
cial operations continue to be adequately maintained. 
These factors combine to indicate that an upgrade to 
"Aaa" would seem appropriate."2
1John E. Peterson, "Minding the Markets", Governmental 
Finance (August, 1977) 52.
2Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, 
Comparative Analysis of State Credits, (Chicago: 1979)
p. 46.
28
Local governments within Montana are largely unrated, 
with only the larger counties and cities having Moody's 
ratings. Montana's larger local governmental entities are 
generally rated A by Moody's.1
The analysis contained in the next chapter will indi­
cate that the difference in interest rates between bonds 
rated Aaa and Aa is about .4 percent.
Montana would appear to meet most of the preconditions 
for a bond bank. The most important precondition being the 
lack of ratings by the numerous local government units 
contrasting to state government's very good rating. Due to 
recent market conditions, the number of issues and demand 
for these issues is difficult to assess.
The question still remains: Will a bond bank provide
any significant savings to local governments? The following 
section of this paper will attempt to examine what effects a 
bond bank might have in Lewis and Clark County.
1Moody's Municipal and Government Manual, 2081-6.
CHAPTER III
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY 
The Case Study Approach
To assess the fiscal impact that a bond bank might 
have on the entire state of Montana would require a projec­
tion of the future capital expenditures of all 966 political 
subdivisions. Local government officials often have dif­
ficulty in providing details on future plans such as con­
struction cost estimates and proposed methods of financing 
the projects.
The case study would seem appropriate for assessing 
the impact of a bond bank for two reasons. By examining the 
effects in an entire county, it is possible to get some 
diversity in the types of local government and capital 
improvements. The second reason is that, for the purpose of 
this paper, the significance of the impact is more important 
than the overall fiscal impact. Significance could best be 
measured by the tax impact the potential cost savings might 
have on the individual taxpayer and would seem to have 
greater relevance when viewed for a single county.
In order to assess the impact of a bond bank, it is 
necessary to make some assumptions about the relative
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interest rates for a proposed bond bank and proposed issues 
of municipal bonds. The assumptions as to relative interest 
will largely dictate the results of the comparison, so it is 
necessary to establish this assumption early.
In that no Montana Bond Bank exists to be rated, it is 
necessary to assign a credit rating to the hypothetical 
agency. Since the state of Montana's general obligation 
rating is currently between Aaa and Aa, a rating for the 
bond bank will be assigned for both conditions.
Bond banks generally receive a rating one grade lower 
than that of the state's general obligation bonds.1 If the 
state's general obligations are to receive the Aaa rating, 
the bond bank would be rated Aa. The Aa rating is the 
rating assigned to the State Housing Authority, which car­
ries the same kind of limited state commitment that the bond 
bank proposals would provide.
It would appear that the Aa rating would be the likely 
rating the state would receive. If the state, however, were 
to be rated one grade lower than the rating received on the 
last general obligation issue of the state, the bond bank 
rating would be A. For purposes of this analysis, both 
potential ratings of the state will be included in the 
analysis.
1Katzman, "Measuring the Benefits of Municipal Bond Banks", 
13.
31
The analysis of the bond bank will use a criterion of 
cost savings to local units of government to evaluate the 
bond bank proposals. Considerations such as the impact a 
bond bank might have on investment firms, investors, or 
state costs will not be considered. While other aspects of 
the bond bank impact may be important, the most contested 
aspect of the bond bank proposal concerns savings to local 
governments.
Description of Lewis and Clark County's 
Proposed Capital Projects
All of the capital projects included in this evalua­
tion are projects that are being actively planned by local 
government officials. All projects are currently in the 
preliminary stages of a bond issue or are being planned with 
bonded debt as the most likely method of financing.
On June 2, 1981, Helena School District Number 1 will 
open bids on $2,966,590 of serial bonds to make improvements 
in Helena's two high schools. Approved by the voters in 
1980, the bonds could not be issued because of the statutory 
interest ceiling.
Climbing interest rates have also delayed plans by the 
city of Helena to proceed with improvements to its water and 
sewer system. By current estimates bringing Helena's aged 
water system into compliance with the Federal Safe Drinking 
Water Act will cost $5,324,000. In addition, design pro­
blems with the city's sewage treatment plan has created an
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odor problem and a health hazard that will require attention 
in the near future. The estimated cost of improvements
to the city's sewage treatment plant is $3,300,000. The 
Environmental Protection Agency would pay eighty percent of 
the sewer costs, leaving the city with a cost of $660,000. 
The total required to make the needed improvements in the 
water and sewer systems is $5,984,000. Progress on these 
improvements has been hindered because of the high interest 
rates that the city would have to pay on the revenue bonds 
needed to finance the projects.1
In the northern portion of Lewis and Clark County, the 
residents of the small community of Lincoln have approved a 
referendum that would create a sewer system for the com­
munity. The community now relies on private septic tanks, 
but community growth and environmental standards are neces­
sitating a public sewer system.
The estimated cost of the sewer project would be 
$2,678,707, of which the Environmental Protection Agency 
would pay $2,238,262 —  leaving the Lincoln Sewer District 
with costs of $440,445. The district had initially hoped to 
receive a low interest loan from the Farmers' Home Adminis­
tration; however, recent federal cuts have dimmed that hope. 
If the federal loan is not forthcoming, the Lincoln Sewer
1(Helena) Independent Record, May 12, 1981, Section B, 
Page 1.
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District will have to finance the project through the is­
suance of revenue bonds.
Nearly two years ago, Lewis and Clark County and the 
City of Helena appointed a committee to study the need for 
new j ail and law enforcement facilities. The committee has 
recommended that a new city-county jail and law enforcement 
facility be constructed. Planning for the facility has 
progressed to the point that an architectural firm has been 
retained to design the facility. The preliminary estimate 
for construction costs is $3,750,000.
The current plan for financing the facility would be 
for Lewis and Clark County to issue general obligation 
bonds. The staff of the planning committee is hopeful that 
the referendum on the bonds for the new jail could be placed 
before the voters of Lewis and Clark County within the next 
year.
Assumptions for Analysis 
The assumptions that will have the greatest impact on 
the outcome of the analysis are those assumptions concerning 
the interest rates to be assigned to various bonds. For 
purposes of this analysis, the total interest charged on an 
issue is not as important as the difference in interest 
rates between bond ratings. The interest rates for each 
bond issue will be determined by the interest rate assigned 
to the rating of the government entity. Interest rates 
change from hour to hour. For purposes of this analysis,
34
the interest rates reflected by Moody’s long term municipal 
bond averages on April 17, 1981, will be used. The April 17 
date is used as the most current data available at the time 
of the analysis. The relative difference between ratings 
remain fairly constant regardless of the change in overall 
interest rates. The average rate on long term maturities 
are indicated in Table 1:
TABLE I
Moody's Municipal Bond Averages 
April 17, 1981
Moody's Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Composite
Average Interest 9.20% 9.60% 10.00% 10.40% 10.13%
Source: Moody's Investor Services, Municipal and Government
Manual; News Reports; (New York: Dun and
Bradstreet Corporation, 1981) Vol. 53, No. 32, 
P. 2633.
The bond rating and interest rates for each of the 
governmental units being considered in the analysis are 
listed. in Table 2. The Lincoln Sewer District has not 
received a rating, and, for purposes of this analysis, will 
be assigned a Baa rating which is probably the best rating 
that the district could hope for.
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TABLE 2
Interest Rates Assigned Local Government Units
Rating Interest
Unit From Table 1 Rate
Lewis and Clark County A 10%
City of Helena A 10%
High School District #1 A 10%
Lincoln Sewer District Baa 10.40%
Aa Bond Bank Aa 9.60%
A Bond Bank A 10%
Source: Moody’s Municipal and Governmental Manual, (1981)
Vol.1, p. 2083-84.
The difference between the state Aa Bond Bank and the 
local A rated governments (.4%) is consistent with other 
estimates of potential interest savings from bond banks with 
Aa ratings. Separate studies of the Vermont and Maine bond 
banks indicated savings of .5% and .38%.1 The comparison, 
earlier in this paper, of issues underwritten by D. A. 
Davidson and Moody's state bond averages indicated a dif­
ference of .58%.
For purposes of analysis, all bond issues will be 
assumed to be twenty year issues of serial bonds in maturi­
ties that allow for equal amortization payments. In the 
current bond market, serial bond issues of up to twenty
xKatzman, "Measuring the Benefits of Municipal Bond Banks", 
10.
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years maturities are the most common method of financing 
public works. The time frame for the analysis of the bonds 
will be the life of the bond issue or twenty years from the 
date of issue.
The analysis shall proceed on the assumption that the 
bond bank was authorized by the 1981 Legislature and that 
the high school and sewer and water issues would be marketed 
in 1981 and the jail and Lincoln sewer issues in 1982.
Assumptions for savings in marketing costs will be 
taken from Katzman's paper on measuring the benefits of 
state bond banks.
The major marketing costs which can be pooled through 
the bond bank include: financial advice, printing of the
notice, prospectus, bond printing and rating services. All 
of the marketing costs are subject to economics of scale 
(see Table 3).
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TABLE 3
Costs of Marketing General Obligation Bonds 
by Cost Category and Issue Size*
(per $1000 of bonds)
Size of
Issue 
($1000s)
Finan. 
Advis.
Bond
Notice
Bond 
Prospts.
Bond 
Prntng.
Bond
Rating
Sub-
Total
0-499 $9.09 $ .62 $ .95 $1.02 $2.01 $13.69
500-999 6.86 .45 .71 .71 1.16 9.89
1000-1999 4.69 .26 .76 .64 .65 7.00
2000-2999 3.70 .13 .59 .34 . 46 5.22
3000-4999 2.40 .13 .26 .24 .29 3.32
5000-9999 2.68 .10 .15 .28 .16 3.37
10,000-24,999 1.45 .05 .07 .17 .09 1.83
25,000 & over .20 .04 .05 .16 .30 .48
* Includes only costs that are pooled by a municipal bond 
bank.
Source: Municipal Finance Officers Association, MFOA
Special Bulletin, "Subject: Costs Involved in
Marketing State/Local Bonds," no date. This 
survey of January, 1973 resulted in 481 responses 
from localities in 44 states. It is not clear 
whether the sample or the respondents were randomly 
selected.
Some assumption must be made as to size of any future 
bond bank offering. The minimum size recommended in the 
study of Maine was $6 million with $10 million being desir­
able. In that just the Lewis and Clark County bonds would 
be $8,950,590 in 1981 and $4,190,000 in 1982, some assump­
tion other than $6 million must be used. A conservative 
estimate would be that the Lewis and Clark County issues 
would comprise one-fourth of all bonds
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issued by the hypothetical bond bank. The state issues 
would be $35,802,360 in 1981 and $16,760,000 in 1982.
For purposes of determining present value, a discount 
rate of eight percent will be used.
Bond Bank Comparison 
Table 5 sets out the projected costs for issuing the 
bonds for each project for local government as well as for 
bond banks with both Aa and A ratings. A bond bank with the 
Aa rating would appear to provide significant savings to all 
levels of local government (see Table 5). The savings to 
all local units, in terms of present value of all costs of 
borrowing money, could be reduced by five percent. The cost 
to the small unrated special district in Lincoln could be 
reduced by eleven percent by the Aa bond bank. Annual 
savings in interest costs would be five percent for all 
units with the Aa bond bank and nine percent for the Lincoln 
Sewer District.
The A bond bank would not produce any significant 
savings for any unit of local government except the Lincoln 
Sewer District. The A bond bank would reduce the total 
present value cost of borrowing for all units by six-tenths 
of one percent and six percent for the Lincoln Sewer Dis­
trict. The A bond bank would not create any annual interest 
savings except for the Lincoln Sewer District, where savings 
would amount to five percent.
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The annual savings to a resident of Helena from the A 
Bond Bank would be nonexistent. The Aa Bond Bank could 
provide savings to a Helena resident who is taxed in all 
jurisdictions except the Lincoln Sewer District. With a Aa 
rate bond bank, the owner of a home with an appraised value 
of $30,000 would have his property taxes reduced by $.96, 
and sewer and water fees could be reduced by $2.66, for a 
total savings of $3.62. The owner of a home in Lincoln with 
an appraised value of $30,000 would receive an estimated 
savings of $8.89. The users of the Lincoln sewer would 
reduce annual charges by $4.00 with the services of an A 
rated bond bank.
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TABLE 4
Potential Savings to Local Government 
From a Hypothetical Bond Bank
Helena 
Water City- 
High School and County Lincoln
___________ Improvements Sewer Jail_______Sewer____ Total
Annual Interest Cost Savings
A Bond Bank $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 1,409 $ 0
Aa Bond Bank 9,381 18,921 11,857 2,801 42,960
Total Interest Savings
A Bond Bank 0 0 0 28,235 28,235
Aa Bond Bank 187,607 378,419 142,288 56,089 764,403
Marketing Cost Savings
A Bond Bank 14,062 17,294 5,587 5,218 42,161
Aa Bond Bank 14,062 17,294 5,587 5,218 42,161
Present Value All Savings
A Bond Bank 14,062 17,294
Aa Bond Bank 106,165 205,936
5,587
122,001
19,051
32,718
55,994
466,820
TABLE 5
Comparison of Issue Costs for Local Governments 
and a Hypothetical Bond Bank
High School Helena Sewer City-County Lincoln 
_______________________ Improvements and Water________Jail________ Sewer________ Total
Average Annual Interest Costs
Local Government $ 195,208 $ 393,761 $ 246,759 $ 30,391 $ 866,119
Aa Bond Bank 185,827 374,840 234,902 27,590 823,159
A Bond Bank 195,208 393,761 246,759 28,982 864,710
Total Interest
Local Government 3,904,160 7,875,228 2,961,108 607,882 15,348,378
Aa Bond Bank 3,716,553 7,496,809 2,818,820 551,793 14,583,975
A Bond Bank 3,904,160 7,875,228 2,961,108 579,647 15,320,143
Marketing Costs
Local Government 15,486 20,166 12,450 6,023 54,125
Aa Bond Bank 1,424 2,872 6,863 805 11,964
A Bond Bank 1,424 2,872 6,863 805 11,964
Present Value All Costs
Local Government 1,932,066 3,886,167 2,435,166 304,406 8,557,805
Aa Bond Bank 1,825,901 3,680,231 2,313,165 271,688 8,090,985
A Bond Bank 1,918,004 3,868,857 2,429,579 285,355 8,501,795
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS
Findings From Lewis and Clark County Comparison 
The finding of other research on bond banks would 
appear to be confirmed by the analysis of Lewis and Clark 
County. The first finding is that bond banks offer no great 
advantage to local governments unless the bond bank's credit 
rating is substantially better than the ratings of local 
government. The second finding would be that a bond bank is 
most beneficial to smaller units of local government who 
have low credit ratings or lack credit ratings. It would 
appear that, even with a poorly rated state bond bank, 
smaller units of government would benefit.
The third finding concerns the impact of the bond 
bank. The savings to larger rated units of government would 
appear to be of no great significance in terms of reducing 
taxes and should not be viewed as any panacea to relieve the 
financial problems of local government. The impact on 
smaller units is significant enough to be viewed as a form 
of state financial aid.
Other Considerations for State Aid
In considering the need for a bond bank or other form
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of state aid for local capital improvements, other factors 
must be considered.
The need for local government capital construction may 
be accelerating. Federal requirements have created needs 
for many capital improvements. In the ease of the projects 
examined in Lewis and Clark County, three of the four pro­
jects were, in some degree, a response to federal require­
ments. In recent years, there has been growing concern that 
the industrial plants and capital facilities of the private 
sector of the economy have been neglected to the detriment 
of national productivity. A recent study by the Council of 
State Planning Agencies raises the issue of worn out facil­
ities in the public sector.1 The study suggests that there 
is a need at all levels of government for repair and re­
placement of public facilities. The need for capital funds 
for local governments may be increasing.
The tax exempt bond itself has been undergoing in­
creased scrutiny in recent years as a method of financing 
local capital improvements. There is increased awareness 
that the tax exempt bond is really a form of federal subsidy 
to local governments. The lower interest rates enjoyed by 
local governments on tax exempt, bonds are at the expense of 
the federal treasury. Because people who buy tax exempt
xPat Choate and Susan Walker, American in Ruins, (Washington 
D. C.: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1981).
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securities tend to be in the highest tax brackets, the tax 
exemption leads to a regressive tax policy. Increased 
scrutiny of tax exempt bonds has largely resulted from the 
growth in industrial revenue and housing bond issues. Not 
only have industrial revenue and housing bonds brought 
increased scrutiny —  they have flooded the tax exempt 
market, increasing interest rates for municipalities.
The growing need for public capital and the growing 
problems with tax exempt bonds may require that new ap­
proaches be developed for the capital needs of state and 
local governments.
A final consideration that should be taken into ac­
count concerning a bond bank is the potential technical 
assistance that a bond bank could offer smaller units of 
government that seldom issue bonds.
Recommendations 
Future legislatures should authorize a state bond 
bank. The potential benefits that a bond bank might offer 
smaller units of local government justify its authorization. 
Participation by larger units of government would be volun­
tary, and they would not need to use the bond bank if it 
offered no benefit.
The legislature should consider authorizing a bond 
bank that pledges the state's full faith and credit to the 
bond bank bond issues. The state's risk with the use of 
reserve accounts would be minimal but the savings in
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interest rates could be significant. The pledge of full 
faith and credit could offer a great deal of assistance to 
local governments with little or no cost to the state. A 
pledge of full faith and credit would assure the bond bank 
a credit rating that would allow the state to have a 
significantly lower interest rate than any unit of local 
government.
If the executive branch of state government supports 
the bond bank concept, efforts should be made to obtain a 
prospective credit rating of the proposed bond bank. If a 
prospective credit rating could be obtained for a bond bank, 
the legislature could have a much firmer estimate of poten­
tial savings to local governments.
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100,000 Fort Benton G.O. 03/10/78 5.32 3.61
73,000 Broadus C.O. 06/15/78 6.00 6.16
1979. C.O. DATE NIC_ BBT
$ 2,662,681 Gallatin Co. GO 02/13/79 5.377. 6.307,
90,000 East Helena GO 01/25/79 6.15 6.30
123,000 Srcvensvillc GO — 07/26/79 6.60 6.19 -
133,336. Three Forks GO (odd amounts)— 03/17/79 6.71 6.30 -
1,800,000 Laurel GO -• 08/01/79 6.30 6.19 -
850,000 Lowistown, UT GO 12/31/79 5.69 7.7 7
S.D.
350,000 Yellowstone Co. SD #37 02/22/79 5.98 6.31
60,000 Flathead Co. SD #39 03/13/79 7.CO 6.33-
631,100 Teton Co. SI) #30 06/26/79 6.05 6.13
503,300 Teton Co. USD #30 06/26/79 6.05('- 6.13
250,000 HeCone Co. USD #!.-• 06/07/79 6.17^ 6.13 1
169,000 Missoula Co. SI) #20 — 06/08/79 6.75 f 6.13
379,500 Lewis & Clark Co. SD #38 05/23/79 6.03 6.25
1980 G.O. DATE NIC _BBT__
99,000 Belgrade C.O. 
S.D.
12/08/80 7.007, 9.84%
350,000 Richland Cn. SD (Lambert) 01/20/80 7 .00 7 . 28
350,000 Jefferson Cn. SD (Montana City) 01/10/80 6.90 7.30
268,000 FI.il head Co. SI) (Cayuso) 01/10/80 6.81 7 .30
305.000 Flathead Co. SD (West Valley) 
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01/15/80 7 .00 7.30
APPENDIX B
TABLE 7 - VOLUME BY STATE - JA N  THRU NOV 1930
----------------------------ALL-IS S U E S ----------------------------
•••S T A T E * * *  SA LES AMOUNT ANIC
50 S ta te s   4,934 42,956,509 8.50
A lab am a................................................  106 615,722 7.84
*  A laska..................................................... II 809,675 9.82
A rizona  71 921,072 7.46
A rk a n s a s   65 . 333,200 7.68
C alifo rn ia   181 3,424,040 8.57
C o lo ra d o .................. i ........................  160 1.047,327 8.52
C o n n e c ticu t.........................................  39 770,342 8.60
D e la w a re .............................................  12 181,086 7.94
F lo r id a   103 2,000,946 8.89
G eorgia  51 751,038 7.82
H a w a ii    7 296,500 6.96
I d a h o   27 226,730 8.04
Illinois  238 2,173,376 8.29
In d ian a .............................................   110 885,951 8.43
I o w a ....................................................... 278 486,834 8.42
K a n s a s ..................................................  183 878,488 7.69
K e n tu ck y    93 353,423 7.94
L o u is ian a .............................................. 68 1,007,081 6.90
V  M a in e ....................................................  22 136,250 7.74
M a ry la n d .............................................  34 966,280 7.34
M assach u se tts ....................................  89 1,173,999 8.41
Michigan .............................................. 250 1,244,521 9.07
M i n n e s o t a . . . ....................................  287 1,156,879 8.00
M ississipp i...........................................  54 387,469 7.37
M isso u ri................................................  88 509,846 8.71
M o n tan a ..................................   1 8 __________________ 113.570____________[T m J
N e b ra s k a .............................................. 115 437,404 8.08
N e v ad a ...................’  21 201,298 8.37
H New H am pshire   18 166,786 7.49
New Je rse y ...........................................  123 869,922 7.87
New M ex ico .........................................  50 388,397 7.40
N e w Y o rk     I l l  3,148,495 9.17
N. C a r o lin a .........................................  62 577,225 7.93
ad-N. D akota   ....................................  49 69,716 7.25
O h io ....................................................... 308 1,406,528 8.22
O k la h o m a ............................................ 122 94S.179 7,93
O re g o n ....................    HO 1,458,279 8.70
P en n sy lv an ia ....................................... 173 1,605,660 8.73
Rhode I s la n d     21 154,680 8.30
S. C a ro lin a . .........................................  35 333,185 8.52
S. D a k o ta . .- . ....................................... 43 216,042 8.33
T ennessee   ...........................  82 839,674 7.95
Texas....................................................... 412 3,660.509 8.14
U t a h .............................................  54 436,565 7.58
V erm o n t................................................  18 161,118 7.56
V irginia..........................................   45 521,19S 7.21
W ash in g to n .........................................  134 1,296,096 9.39
W . V irg in ia .........................................  24 413.170 7.99
W isconsin  121 683,273 8.01
W y o m in g . . . ....................................... 38 111,468 7.34
■ Amounts in thousands.
• ANIC - average net interest cost weighted by
average maturity (life) and sire of issue.
